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Faculty and Deans

CAUGHT IN THE TRAP: PRICING RACIAL
HOUSING PREFERENCES
A. Mechele Dickerson*
THE TwO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS &
FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE {WITH SURPRISING SOLUTIONS THAT
WILL CHANGE OUR CHILDREN'S FuTuRES). By Elizabeth Warren &

Amelia Warren Tyagi. New York: Basic Books. 2004. Pp. xv, 255.
$26.00.

INTRODUCTION

In The Two-Income Trap, Harvard Law School Professor
Elizabeth Warren and business consultant Amelia Warren Tyagi reach
a startling conclusion: a two-income middle-class family faces greater
financial risks today than a one-income family faced three decades
ago. Middle-class families are caught in an "income trap" because they
budget based on two incomes and face financial ruin if they lose an
income or incur unexpected expenses. The authors suggest that most
middle-class families cannot quickly adjust their budgets because their
largest monthly expense is the fixed mortgage payment. The parents
maintained that they had to allocate a significant portion of their
income to housing expenses to ensure they could buy a home in a
good neighborhood with good, safe schools (pp. 22-23, 29, 32).
Moreover, because good schools are located in expensive
neighborhoods, parents contend that they must participate in a highpriced bidding war for those homes. If their income declines or
expenses increase, however, they are trapped: unable to pay the
mortgage and unable to quickly reduce their living expenses (pp. 7-8).
The book never explains how parents determine what is a "good,"
"safe" neighborhood or school. Housing and school segregation
patterns suggest, however, that some middle-class parents consciously
* Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School. B.A. 1984, J.D. 1988, Harvard.Ed. My thanks to Sheryll Cashin, Leland Ware, Elizabeth Warren, and Mary Jo Wiggins for
reviewing an earlier draft of this Review and for providing detailed and helpful suggestions
and comments. The Review also benefited from comments I received at a faculty workshop
at Notre Dame Law School. I am grateful to Felicia Burton for the support she cheerfully
provided and for the able research assistance provided by James Langan, Angela Montag,
Brian Rosenau, and Kristine Schmidt. Finally, I thank my father, Warner Dickerson, for his
racial perspective and views. His advice vastly improved the arguments in this Review, and
(more importantly) has made me a better person.
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or unconsciously use "good and safe" as a proxy for predominately or
exclusively "nonminority." This Review suggests that middle-income
parents can no longer afford these racial housing preferences. The
Review summarizes the problems middle-class families face then
argues that what is viewed as "good" and "safe" may be based more
on racially biased perceptions than on reality. The Review concludes
by arguing that the best way to help middle-class families avoid the
income trap is to make school assignments without regard to the
student's street address and to allow parents who live in integrated
neighborhoods to participate in an auction to buy a slot in their firstchoice school.
I.

THE TwO-INCOME TRAP

A. Summary

The Two-Income Trap uses data collected in a consumer
bankruptcy project and attempts to explain why the middle class is
struggling financially. While some media reports negatively portray
debtors as reckless or irresponsible, 1 the book contends that most
financially beleaguered consumers are not "the usual suspects" and,
instead, are middle-class parents with children (p. 6). The modern
middle-class family differs from their middle-class counterparts three
decades ago primarily because both spouses now work in the market.
Notwithstanding those two incomes, the book stresses that modern
families are at a higher risk financially because they lack the safety net
of the stay-at-home mother's untapped income. This income could
protect them if the sole breadwinner lost his job, or if the family
needed extra income to pay for college expenses or unexpected
medical expenses. 2
The book compares consumer spending data from the 1970s and
2000 and documents that, after adjusting for inflation, today's twoincome middle-class family spends less overall on nonhousing
expenditures than they did thirty years ago (pp. 16-17, 195-96). The
book recognizes that some middle-class families may sometimes
"fritter away" money (pp. 19, 21), but argues that the data show that
most families do not face financial crises because they overspend and
overconsume.3 While nonhousing costs have decreased, housing costs
1. See generally A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy Reform: Does the End Justify the
Means?, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 243, 261-67 (2001) (discussing the negative image of debtors
portrayed in the media).

2. Pp. 57-62. Stay-at-home spouses also were protected if the couple divorced because
they could use their untapped income to support themselves if they received inadequate
financial assistance from their ex-spouses. /d. at 7-8.
3. The book concedes that families spend more on some items (including entertainment
units and home computers) now than they did thirty years ago, but documents that overall
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increased dramatically largely because parents feel compelled to
participate in a "bidding war" for homes in certain neighborhoods to
ensure that their children attend a good, safe school (pp. 28, 31-32).
Households historically spent no more than twenty-five to twentyeight percent of gross monthly income on housing expenses.
Currently, more and more families devote half of their combined
income to housing expenses. 4
The authors note that societal changes, including increased job
instability, the lack of comprehensive health insurance, and increased
divorce rates 5 have dramatically increased middle-income families'
financial risks. 6 The authors suggest that families resist radically
reducing their monthly expenses if they face a financial setback
because doing so would prevent them from having a "normal middleclass life," i.e., a good job, quality education for children (day care,
pre-school, K-12 and college), owning an automobile (pp. 32-33, 52),
and that it would deprive them of the primary symbol of "the good
life," i.e., homeownership (pp. 8, 20, 23-38). The costs associated with
a normal middle-class life prevent families from saving enough, which
is okay if both parents remain employed, remain healthy, and remain
married (pp. 66-67).
B.

Solutions and Critique

The book's greatest attribute is its comprehensive analysis of the
financial plight of the middle class. The data and proposed solutions
presented in the Two-Income Trap will help policymakers who seek
both standard and nontraditional approaches to help the financially
strapped middle class. 7 Certainly, some of the expenditures middle-

nonhousing spending (including spending for clothing, groceries, and major appliances) has
decreased. /d. at 16-19.
4. P. 133. The authors criticize mortgage lenders for issuing "unmanageable mortgages"
and for decreasing the requirement that buyers put down a sizeable down payment when
buying a home. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE
NATION'S HOUSING (2003).
5. Middle-class couples have higher divorce rates than other groups. Since they barely
could pay their bills with two incomes, they are especially ill-equipped to maintain two
households. Pp. 83-86.
6. These families often borrow money from subprime lenders. See U.S. DEP'T OF
HOUS. & URBAN DEY., UNEQUAL BURDEN: INCOME AND RACAL DISPARITIES IN
SUBPRIME
LENDING
IN
AMERICA
(hereinafter
UNEQUAL
BURDEN],
at
http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelf18/pressrel/subprime.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2005).
These loans are secured by the family home and often have astronomically high interest
rates that make the family's financial predicament even worse. See generally A. Mechele
Dickerson, Bankruptcy and Mortgage Lending: The Homeowner Dilemma, 38 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
7. Indeed, the authors' recommendations have been championed both by conservatives
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class families may view as necessities might better be characterized as
desires 8 and economists may question whether middle-class families'
mortgage payments are disproportionately large relative to their
income. 9 Few dispute, however, that today's middle-class families face
exogenous risks that were nonexistent a generation ago.
The authors present a series of recommended actions to combat
those risks and help families: save more (pp. 32-33); avert financial
crisis (pp. 93-94); finance their children's preschool (p. 122) and
college (pp. 45-46) education; and, avoid making unwise financial
choices once they face a financial crisis (pp. 142-152). Because housing
costs appear to be the primary reason families spend too much and
save too little, the authors specifically urge them to avoid stretching to
buy a home they cannot afford (p. 165). They then more broadly argue
that a public school voucher program that allows parents to choose
schools without regard to their home's location would de-escalate the
bidding wars (pp. 34-36).
The most provocative finding in this recent work, and one not
discussed in detail in the authors' prior works, 10 is that two incomes are
not necessarily better than one. The authors avoid making sociological
conclusions about how children are affected by both parents working
outside the home 11 and, instead, nonjudgmentally report that not
(school vouchers, increased personal responsibility) and liberals (government subsidized
preschool, consumer-credit interest-rate caps).
8. For example, middle-class families' perception that their children will be at a
competitive disadvantage if they do not attend a quality preschool program, pp. 37-39, has
little empirical support. See Beth Azar, The Debate Over Child Care Isn't Over Yet ... ,
MONITOR
ON
PSYCHOL.,
Mar.
2000,
at
32,
at
http://www.apa.org/monitor/marOO/childcare.html. But cf Juan Antonio Lizama, Preschool
Gives Kids a Good Start/Physical, Social, Language and Thinking Skills Are Developed
Through Play, RICH. TiMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 3, 2004, at Bl. Indeed, recent reports suggest
that home-schooled students succeed both academically and socially in college. See generally
John Cloud & Jodie Morse, Home Sweet School: The New Home Schoolers Aren't Hermits.
They Are Diverse Parents Getting Results- and Putting the Heat on Public Schools, TIME
MAG., Aug. 27. 2001, at 46. Likewise, notwithstanding car-seat laws, most middle-class
families don't need expensive SUVs and, in any event, "need" them only while their children
are young. Pp. 48-49 (suggesting SUV purchases might be warranted because of mandatory
car-seat laws). Finally, while most people may now view Internet access, cable television,
and cellular phones as nonluxuries, as the book notes, it is hard to characterize these
expenditures as necessities. P. 19.
9. See Marilyn Kennedy Melia, Overspending On Mortgage Leaves Families Vulnerable,
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 2, 2003, at Cl.
10. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1003, 1022-23;
Elizabeth Warren, Under Bankruptcy Clash, A Quiet Attack on Women, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., May 20, 2002, at 6. Elizabeth Warren coauthored two previous books with Theresa
Sullivan and Jay Lawrence Westbrook. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE
OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989); TERESA A.
SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000).
11. But see Gwendolyn Freed, Double Trouble: 2 Incomes Not Enough, STAR TRIB.,
Sept. 20, 2003, at lD (expressing concerns that the book will be used to castigate working
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having the safety net of the stay-at-home mother's unearned income
hurts the modern middle-class family. The book adroitly links housing
choice to school choice, something courts and government agencies
rarely do. By linking housing choice to school choice, the book
demonstrates that the problems associated with urban schools increase
housing costs for suburban parents. While the data presented in the
book demonstrate that making school assignments based on zip codes
increases housing costs, it does not consider the racial implications of
the contention that the housing bidding wars exist only because
parents want to live in a "good" neighborhood that has "good"
schools. The next Part of this Review provides a more racialized
explanation for the suburban bidding wars. I suggest that parents often
make educational and housing decisions based on perception, not
reality. I then argue that at least some home purchases reflect the
buyers' conscious or unconscious racial biases against living in racially
integrated neighborhoods and having their children attend racially
integrated schools.
II.

MIDDLE-CLASS HOUSING AND EDUCATIONAL PREFERENCES

A.

Middle-Class Behavioral Biases

The middle-class parents in The Two-Income Trap contend that
they have two choices: live in an affordable (typically urban 12)
neighborhood but have their children attend bad schools, or live in an
overly expensive (typically suburban) neighborhood that has safe,
good schools. Few dispute that the quality of public schools is
capitalized into housing prices or that higher-income residents are
targeted by advertising that markets the quality of the zoned public
schoolsY Some parental concerns about safety or school violence may,
however, be distorted by a biased and flawed decisionmaking process.
The law and behavioral choice literature suggest that people perceive
mothers).
12. I use the terms "urban" and "inner city" as a social construct to describe
neighborhoods or schools that are low-income and predominantly minority. See PEDRO A.
NOGUERA, CITY SCHOOLS AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: RECLAIMING THE PROMISE OF
PUBLIC EDUCATION 23 (2003) (discussing common uses of the terms urban, inner city,
ghetto, barrio, slum and hood).

13. See, e.g., CONNIE CHUNG, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, HARVARD UNIV.,
USING PUBLIC SCHOOLS AS COMMUNITY-DEVELOPMENT TOOLS: STRATEGIES FOR
COMMUNITY-BASED DEVELOPERS 8 (Oct. 2002); Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School
Desegregation: Impacts on Metropolitan Society, 80 MINN. L. REV. 825, 848 (1996); Melissa
Kassler, Growing Pains: Once in the Heart of Farm Country, the Teays Valley School District
Wrestles with Rapid Development and the Changes it Brings, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 17,
2003, at lA; cf Capiccioni v. Brennan Naperville, Inc., 791 N.E.2d 553 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003)
(allowing suit for negligent misrepresentation for an ad that incorrectly stated zoned school).
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that they face risks from events that are discussed frequently or are
otherwise memorable because those events are fresh in their minds
and, thus, "available. " 14 This "availability heuristic" makes people
believe that certain events are more common than they actually areY
The media tends to overreport violent incidents of crime that occur
in urban areas 16 and to sensationalize incidents of school violence,
even though crime rates have dropped sharply in the last decadeP
Given this, it is not surprising that middle-class families (especially
white parents who have little contact with urban school children) think
that urban neighborhoods and schools are much more violent than
they actually are, believe that violence in schools is increasing, and
conclude that they must flee from heterogeneous urban areas to
homogeneous suburban ones. Likewise, stereotyping (another
behavioral tendency) also may cause middle-class parents to believe
they must live in certain neighborhoods. Specifically, when the costs of
deliberation are high, people tend to make decisions by considering
the similarities between the facts involving the decision they currently
face and the facts involved with prior cases. 18 If middle-class parents
(or people they know) have had a bad experience with certain people
in a neighborhood or school, they may decide to move away from
those neighborhoods or schools based on this stereotyped assessment.
B.

Perception, Reality, and K-12 Schools

Much of society's concern over the perceived decrease in quality
and increase in crime in schools appears to be based on subjective
beliefs, not objective facts 19 and the authors acknowledge that much of
what middle-class parents "believe" may be based not on reality but
on "parental psychology- worry" (p. 26). Of course, not all parental
perceptions and fears about either the quality or safety of public
schools are flawed or otherwise unfounded, and the increased reliance

14. See Cass Sunstein, The Future of Law and Economics: Looking Forward: Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1188 (1997).
15. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1087 (2000); see
also id. at 1088 (discussing a study that suggests that people believe homicides and car
accidents kill more Americans than the statistically more-common events of developing
diabetes and stomach cancer).
16. Rod Watson, Coverage of Crime Often Distorts Reality, BUFF. NEWS, May 17, 2001,
at B1; see also NOGUERA, supra note 12, at 15.
17. NOGUERA, supra note 12, at 26. Violent personal crime rates do, however, remain
significantly higher for urban areas than suburban or rural areas. I d.
18. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1188.
19. NOGUERA, supra note 12, at 103 (commenting that "fear drives public policy more
than data or research").
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on quantitative data and laws that rank schools and rate some as
"failing" or "persistently dangerous" will only increase parents'
resolve to avoid certain schools.2° Parents likely are correct in
concluding that where you live and go to school helps determine the
quality of your life and potentially affects your life achievements. 21
Some public schools have high crime rates, have drug or gang
problems, have inadequate supplies and facilities, are underfunded,
have less-competent and demoralized teachers, 22 and have relatively
lower test scores. 23
Notwithstanding the perception that public schools are unsafe,
almost ninety percent of all school children in this country attend
public schools.Z4 Moreover, while public schools are criticized,

20. The No Child Left Behind Act attempts to make school safety statistics transparent
and gives parents the right to transfer their child to a "safe" school if the school their child
attends is listed on a list of "persistently dangerous" schools or if the child has been a victim
of a violent criminal offense while attending her school. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 7116, 7912. See also
GARY 0RFIELD & CHUNG ME! LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV.,
BROWN AT 50: KING'S DREAM OR PLESSY'S NIGHTMARE? 8 (2004). Some parents appear to
select homes based on school testing scores. See, e.g., Ana Beatriz Cholo, Investing in Public
Education, CHIC. TRIB., Mar. 30, 2003, at C1; Thomas Grillo, Newton Home Prices Soar;
Schools Seen As Key, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 29, 2003, at A1; Milan Simonich, Is This Match
Made in Heaven?, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 4, 1998, at Al.
21. Of course, even public schools that are not "good" or "safe" may nonetheless
provide valuable support to the children who attend those schools, especially if the schools
are safer than the neighborhoods where the children live, or the school provides meals,
health care, or clothing that the children otherwise could not afford. See NOGUERA, supra
note 12, at 6, 40-41 (characterizing urban public schools as "important social welfare
institutions").
22. See CHUNG, supra note 13, at 23-25; ERICA FRANKENBERG & CHUNG ME! LEE, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., CHARTER SCHOOLS AND RACE: A LOST
OPPORTUNITY FOR INTEGRATED EDUCATION 14 (2003); Tell Truth on School Crime, L.A.
TIMES, July 11, 2003, at 14.
23. See ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV .,
A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM?
11 (2003). But cf ANTHONY D. LUTKUS & ARLENE W. WEINER, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE NATION'S REPORT CARD: TRIAL URBAN DISTRICT
ASSESSMENT,
READING
HIGHLIGHTS
2003
(Dec.
2003),
at
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pubs/
dst2003/2004459.asp (disputing suggestion that urban areas consistently underperform).
While many people may associate violence with urban schools, some of the most notorious
(and horrific) crimes committed in schools have occurred (as the authors note) in middleclass or upper-class suburban districts. See also Cheryl Wetzstein, Make Aware, or Scare?
(Measuring Increase in School Violence Against Heavy Media Coverage), INSIGHT ON THE
NEWS, July 6, 1998, at 37; Glenn Muschert, Columbine Coverage Shook the Nation, USA
TODAY MAG., Aug. 2003, at 14.
24. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF
EDUCATION STATISTICS, 2002: CHAPTER 1. ALL LEVELS OF EDUCATION, at
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d02/ch_l.asp#1 (last visited Jan. 23, 2005). See generally
NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY SCHOOLS AND DISTRICTS: SCHOOL YEAR 2000-01 (May 2002), at
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pilloried, and politicized, school crime rates have declined overall25
Urban public schools are not bad or unsafe because of the skin color
of their students. Instead, urban schools tend to have lower test scores
and relatively higher reported cases of violence because their students
are largely poor and data indicate that poverty (not skin tone) affects
educational outcomes. 26
If most families are in a trap because they want to send their
children to "good" and "safe" schools, then it is imperative to discern
how they determine what is "good" and "safe." Some of their
decisionmaking processes may be influenced by behavioral biases. As
discussed in the next Part, however, the persistence of racially
segregated housing and education in this country suggest that their
stated preference for "safe" and "good" neighborhoods and schools
may actually be a code for a preference to live in a nonminority27
neighborhood and have their children attend nonminority schools. 28

III. RACIAL HOUSING PREFERENCES
Racially segregated neighborhoods have always existed in the
United Sates and, unfortunately, remain the norm in many localities.
From the 1930s until the 1950s, the federal government had racially
discriminatory policies, including refusing to make mortgage loans to
blacks, encouraging whites to use restrictive racial covenants that

http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2002/overview.
25. NAT'L CrR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., INDICATORS OF SCHOOL
CRIME AND SAFETY, 2003, at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2004/crime03/index.asp (last visited Jan.
23, 2005).
26. FRANKENBERG ET AL, supra note 23, at 35. The children who attend urban schools
have higher mobility rates (often because they are homeless, the children of migrant
workers, or renters who tend to move more than homeowners), and these schools have
higher teacher turnover rates. See also ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 20, at 20-21; Orfield,
supra note 13, at 861.
27. By "nonminority" I do not mean exclusively white. Instead, I define nonminority
based on parental perceptions. Since nonminorities consistently report that they prefer to
live in and have their children attend integrated schools, in their minds there appears to be
an acceptable, comfortable level of integration. Once there are too many minorities in a
neighborhood or school, some parents conclude that the neighborhood or school is a
minority one even though the number of minorities living in the neighborhood or attending
the school may still be significantly less than fifty percent. See LEONARD STENHORN &
BARBARA DIGGS-BROWN, BY THE COLOR OF OUR SKIN 33 (1999).
28. Both whites and minorities prefer that their children attend schools where their
children will not be in the minority racially and also prefer schools that are not
overwhelmingly minority. While whites may have a stronger preference, some affluent
blacks prefer to send their children to private schools rather than public schools if most of
the children in the zoned public school are lower-income. See Sheryll D. Cashin, MiddleClass Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A Post-Integrationist Vision for
Metropolitan America, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 729,733 (2001).
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discriminated against black prospective homeowners, 29 and
undervaluing property in black neighborhoods. 30 Even when blacks
overcame these obstacles and purchased a home in a white
neighborhood, the neighborhood likely would resegregate either
because of realtor "blockbusting" practices or because (as discussed in
more detail below) white residents chose to voluntarily segregate. 31
While blatant housing discrimination is now illegal,32 these prior
policies· and practices appear to cause residential segregation to
persist. 33 In addition, notwithstanding state and federal
antidiscrimination housing laws, real estate agents still "steer"
minorities to minority neighborhoods and white purchasers to white
neighborhoods, 34 the mortgage loan rejection rates for minorities is
significantly higher than the rejection rates for whites with
similar financial profiles,35 and some lenders continue to engage in
residential redlining. 36

29. See Richard H. Sander, Individual Rights and Demographic Realities: The Problem
of Fair Housing, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 874, 878 (1988); see also Martha R. Mahoney, Shaping
American Communities: Segregation, Housing and the Urban Poor, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659,
1670-71 (1995). In fact, these policies thwarted white preferences for integrated
neighborhoods since it prevented blacks from getting federally funded or insured mortgages,
and few homeowners of any race could afford to buy a home without that assistance. /d.
30. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 150 (1993); Margalynne
Armstrong, Race and Property Values in Entrenched Segregation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV.1051,
1056-57 (1998). This ranking appears to be the genesis for redlining, i.e., a rating system that
characterizes black neighborhoods as riskier than white neighborhoods and prevents
residents of those neighborhoods from receiving the most favorable loans. See Alex M.
Johnson, Jr., How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent Integration: Destabilizing Race as a
Vehicle to Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1595, 1612-13 (1995).
31. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 30, at 37-38; Mary Jo Wiggins, Race, Class, and
Suburbia: The Modern Black Suburb as a "Racemaking Situation", 35 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 749, 762 (2002).
32 See Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604; see also Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948) (invalidating racial covenants).
33. See Leland Ware, Race and Urban Space: Hypersegregated Housing Patterns and the
Failure of School Desegregation, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 55, 55-56 (2002).
34. /d. at 66.
35. See URBAN INST., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEY., WHAT WE KNOW
ABOUT MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION (1999); Michael H. Schill, Local
Enforcement of Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in Housing: The New York City Human
Rights Commission, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 991, 996 (1996); Joel Glenn Brenner & Liz
Spayd, A Pattern of Bias in Mortgage Loans, WASH. POST, June 6, 1993, at A1; H. Jane
Lehman, Study: Race Factor in Loan Rejections, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1992, at F1;
ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS FOR REFORM NOW (ACORN), GIVING
NO CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE (1998), at http://www.acorn.org/ACORNarchives.
36. Minorities often cannot get prime mortgage loans and often rely on high cost
subprime loans. Indeed, the subprime lending industry appears to target minorities - even
those in the upper incomes. See UNEQUAL BURDEN, supra note 6 (discussing findings that
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Even though all discriminatory lending and most discriminatory
housing practices are now illegal, neighborhoods in this country
largely remain segregated. Ironically, opinion polls and surveys
indicate that most people prefer to live in an integrated neighborhood
and have their children attend integrated schoolsY How much
integration people prefer (and why they prefer it), however, appears
to vary dramatically by race. Neither blacks nor whites want to live in
a neighborhood (or have their children attend schools) if their race is
in the minority (though racial minorities appear much more willing to
live in neighborhoods where they are slightly in the minority). 38 Blacks
appear to prefer living in racially integrated neighborhoods both
because they perceive the homes in those neighborhoods are better
and also because they value the concept of integration. Whites appear
to prefer integrated neighborhoods only if the neighborhood remains
stably integrated and the minority homeowners are in the same
socioeconomic class as the existing residents. 39
Despite these stated preferences and this country's increasing
racial and ethnic diversity, inner cities largely remain segregated. 40
Likewise, despite the influx of minorities, residential segregation also
remains high in the suburbs. 41 Indeed, since the average white person
lives in a neighborhood that is eighty percent white,42 the average
black person lives in a neighborhood that is only thirty-three percent

almost forty percent of homeowners in upper-income black neighborhoods have subprime
refinance loans in contrast to only six percent of the homeowners living in upper-income
white neighborhoods); see also U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., CURBING
PREDATORY
HOME
MORTGAGE
LENDING
(June
2000),
at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/hsgfinlcurbig.html.
37. FRANKENBERG & LEE, supra note 22, at 15; Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovksy, The Integration Game, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1965, 1986 & nn.84-86, 1987 &
n.87 (2000); cf Schill, supra note 35, at 995 (suggesting that whites prefer neighborhoods
with no or just a few black residents whereas blacks prefer communities where the racial
balance between blacks and whites is 50/50). Whites may, however, favor integration only if
their neighborhood is not the one that is integrated. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 1609.
38. See Cashin, supra note 28, at 737-38; Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Processes of
Residential Segregation, in URBAN INEQUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM FOUR CITIES 217, 233,
234 fig. 4.6 (Alice O'Connor et al. eds., 2001); Orfield, supra note 13, at 831; Sander, supra
note 29, at 896-97 (suggesting that whites prefer neighborhoods that are eighty percent white
whereas blacks prefer neighborhoods that are from thirty to sixty percent black).
39. See Sander, supra note 29, at 896.
40. See LEWIS MUMFORD CTR., ETHNIC DIVERSITY GROWS, NEIGHBORHOOD
INTEGRATION LAGS BEHIND (Dec. 18, 2001), at http://browns4.dyndns.org/cen2000_s4/
WholePop/WPreport!MumfordReport.pdf.
41. 0RFIELD & LEE, supra note 20, at 3, 15; MUMFORD CTR., supra note 40, at 4.
42. MUMFORD CTR., supra note 40, at 1. Of course, it is unclear whether whites avoid
integrated neighborhoods because of racial preferences or because realtors steer them away
from those neighborhoods.
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white, 43 and many blacks live in virtually all-black neighborhoods,44
there arguably has been little improvement in residential segregation. 45
While public and private discrimination may cause some residential
segregation, most existing segregation patterns largely appear
to be voluntary46 and, notwithstanding any stated preferences, the
process of "dynamic resegregation" keeps neighborhoods and
schools segregated.47
Data consistently show that, once minorities integrate
neighborhoods or send their children to previously segregated
neighborhood schools, the neighborhoods and schools resegregate. 48
Studies find that white homeowners flee once a certain (often quite
small) percentage of nonwhite residents move into the neighborhood
and it "tips" from nonminority to minority. Though the exact tipping
point is unclear, data suggest that school integration consistently fails
largely because of neighborhood resegregation. 49 Why whites flee
neighborhoods and why residential segregation persists for all income
groups despite antidiscrimination laws generally is attributed to two
main views. First, some commentators suggest that some whites simply
dislike minorities and prefer not to be with or live near them, or that
they dislike integration because they fear that it will cause white flight
and, ultimately, force them to live in a predominately minority
neighborhood. 50 Similarly, whites may prefer to live near other

43. Id.
44. LEONARD STEINHORN & BARBARA DIGGS-BROWN, BY THE COLOR OF OUR SKIN
31 (1999); Maria Krysan & Reyholds Farley, The Residential Preferences of Blacks: Do They
Explain Persistent Segregation, 80 SOCIAL FORCES 937, 940, 969 (2002).
45. See MUMFORD CTR., supra note 40, at 29 (observing no improvement in black-white
residential segregation in the New York metropolitan area in the last two decades and
noting that residential segregation levels for whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians remain at
the same levels that existed in 1960).
46. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 30, at 61, 193-200; Paul Boudreaux, An
Individual Preference Approach to Suburban Racial Desegregation, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
533,545, n.61 (1999).
47. See Gary Orfield, The Movement for Housing Integration: Rationale and the Nature
of the Challenge, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY 18, 21 (John M.
Goering ed., 1986); Ware, supra note 33, at 66.
48. Indeed, schools may resegregate quicker than neighborhoods because a significant
percentage of minorities who integrate neighborhoods are younger and have children. See
NOGUERA, supra note 12, at 39; Orfield, supra note 13, at 851.
49. See Bruce L. Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question of
Racial Occupancy Controls, 26 STAN. L. REV. 245, 251-60 (1974) (suggesting that the tipping
point may range from twenty-five to sixty percent); Cashin, supra note 28, at 744-45
(suggesting tipping point is forty percent); Orfield, supra note 13, at 851; Thomas C.
Schelling, A Process of Residential Segregation: Neighborhood Tipping, in RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 157, 157-84 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972).
50. See David R. Harris, Property Values Drop When Black Move In, Because ... :
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whites because "whiteness" connotes safe, stable, employed, and
educated neighbors. 51
The second theory suggests that economic factors cause residential
segregation and white flight. Since blacks earn on average less than
whites, some racial residential segregation occurs naturally because
blacks cannot afford to live near their richer white counterparts. 52
Whites also might flee integrating neighborhoods because of their
concern that property values will depreciate. Even though it is
irrational to believe that a homeowner's skin color actually affects the
value of her house, data suggest that homes in minority neighborhoods
tend to appreciate less than comparable homes in nonminority
neighborhoods. 53 Indeed, whether the race of the homeowner actually
causes the value of the home to decline largely is irrelevant as long as
there is a negligible market of potential white buyers of homes in
integrated neighborhoods or most white buyers believe that homes in
integrated neighborhoods are worth less than homes in white
neighborhoods. Upper- and middle-income homeowners are also said
to flee integrating neighborhoods because they fear that lower-income
minority neighbors will take advantage of the lower housing prices
that typically follow white flight. 54 They fear that lower-income
residents will increase taxes because the higher rates of drug use,
crime, and out-of-wedlock births associated with those groups will
increase the demand for social and public services. 55
A final economic consideration is the belief that suburban housing
is more affordable and that these areas have more jobs and other
neighborhood amenities (including good schools and retail stores). 56
Finally, dynamic resegregation may occur because, as discussed in Part
Racial and Socioeconomic Determinants of Neighborhood Desirability, 64 AM. Soc. REv.
461, 461 (1999); Sander, supra note 29, at 901.

51. See Mahoney, supra note 29, at 1661 ("For whites, residential segregation is one of
the forces giving race a 'natural' appearance: 'good' neighborhoods are equated with
whiteness, and 'black' neighborhoods are equated with joblessness.").
52. Of course, this theory fails to explain why poor and middle class neighborhoods
remain segregated. See Cashin, supra note 28, at 739, 741 n.58.
53. See generally Harris, supra note 50.
54. Cf Cashin, supra note 28, at 742 (discussing a suburb that became majority black but
had an increase in both income and education level). Again, the desire not to live near
people of a lower economic or social class is not limited to whites. See id. at 751-52
(expressing the "'quiet truth" that middle-class blacks also are uncomfortable living near
lower-income blacks and that they "can be just as hostile to the urban poor as their white
counterparts"); Orfield, supra note 13, at 853.
55. See Harris, supra note 50, at 464; Orfield, supra note 13, at 831.
56. Mahoney, supra note 29, at 1673; Orfield, supra note 13, at 838; Wiggins, supra note
31, at 773-74; Dahleen Glanton, Lingering Lines of Discrimination: The Neighborhood is
Solidly Middle Class, But Its Residents Have Trouble Getting Even a Pizza Delivered to Their
Front Door, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1,1998, at Perspective 1.
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II.A., people make generalizations and stereotype. Predominately
minority public schools have more students who live in poverty, and
schools with high percentages of poor students generally tend to have
higher crime rates but lower standardized test scores. Given this,
middle-class parents might rationally use race as a proxy for quality,
and leave racially transitioning neighborhoods and schools rather than
wait to see whether the quality or safety of the integrating
neighborhood or school in fact declines. 57
Whatever the cause for residential and school racial segregation, it
remains a fixture in our society. Urban public schools have largely
been written off as unacceptable for parents who have access to better
schools, and the white community overall is largely critical of (and at
times hostile to) most attempts to improve these schools. 58 While it is
unlikely that all middle-class white parents affirmatively dislike
minorities, given the prominent role race has played in shaping this
country's history and cultural heritage, some middle-class parents who
join the suburban bidding wars either consciously or unconsciously59
prefer nonminority neighborhoods and schools. Indeed, even if their
beliefs about the quality of certain schools are irrational, until they are
given incentives to challenge those beliefs, they will continue to
participate in the bidding wars.
IV. RELEASING MIDDLE-CLASS PARENTS FROM THE TRAP
A. Pricing Housing Preferences

Middle-class parents who flee racially integrated neighborhoods
and schools and participate in the bidding wars ("non-Integrationists")
pay a segregation tax or premium for this race-based preference. 60
Standard economic theory posits that people will be forced to bear the
cost of satisfying their particular preferences (in this case, to avoid

57. See ANDREW HACKER, TwO NATIONS BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,
UNEQUAL 27-28 (suggesting that acting on limited information is normal and may be
reasonable); Johnson, supra note 30, at 1623 (suggesting that "it is fully possible that in
certain settings, race-and sex-based generalizations are economically rational as proxies for
relevant characteristics" (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination,
SOC. PHIL & POL'Y, Spring 1991, at 22, 27)).
58. See NOGUERA, supra note 12, at 5; Orfield, supra note 13, at 871.
59. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The ld, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322 (1987) (suggesting that "[t]o the extent
that [a] cultural belief system" influenced by race "has influenced all of us, we are all racists.
At the same time, most of us are unaware of our racism.").
60. See John 0. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067, 1101 (1998) (citing research that indicates whites would pay a
thirteen percent premium to live in an all-white neighborhood).
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minorities) in a perfectly competitive economy. 61 Yet, all homeowners
who live in segregated neighborhoods (even the ones who do not
dislike minorities and may have been steered to a segregated
neighborhood by a realtor) are forced to pay this premium. Since
middle-income parents of all races should share an interest in having
affordable housing, they would benefit by working together to
eliminate practices or actions that cause housing prices to
rise unnecessarily.
The data presented in the Two Income Trap indicate that middleclass parents can no longer afford to pay the segregation tax without
placing themselves at risk financially. Non-Integrationist parents who
prefer segregated neighborhoods and schools but want to avoid
financial ruin may be forced to pay for this preference by delaying or
deferring home ownership. Instead, they may have to rent either a
home or an apartment in a segregated neighborhood until their
children graduate from high school. 62 While non-Integrationists
ostensibly could buy a smaller suburban home, real estate prices in
favored school districts suggest that even a small bungalow in these
neighborhoods may no longer be a realistic option. 63 Of course,
renting would cause parents to lose the asset that constitutes the bulk
of wealth for many in the middle class (i.e., the home ),64 may increase
their overall housing costs, and might symbolically "signal that their
middle-class lives are slipping away" (p. 53). If, however, nonIntegrationist parents value segregated neighborhoods and
schools more than homeownership, then this may well be the best
option for them.
Middle-class parents who prefer homeownership but also want to
avoid the two-income trap may need to reduce their preference for
segregated neighborhoods and make homeownership their primary
preference - even if the home is in an integrated neighborhood. 65
61. Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 139 (1994).
fi2. Though fifi% of total US households are homeowners, there is a racial gap.
Homeownership rates for whites for the year end 2000 were 72.4%, 46.3% for African
Americans, 45.7% for Hispanics, and 53.2% for Asians. PATRICK A. SIMMONS, FANNIE
MAE FOUNDATION, CENSUS NOTE 7: CHANGES IN MINORITY HOMEOWNERSHIP DURING
THE 1990s (2001).
63. See Thomas Grillo, Newton Home Prices Soar; Schools Seen as Key, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 29,2003, at Al.
64. James S. Jackson & Nicholas A. Jones, New Directions in Thinking About Race in
America: African Americans in a Diversifying Nation, AFR. AM. RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES,
Winter 2001, at 1, 11.
65. Behavioral economics literature suggests that preferences are not fixed and can
change or be manipulated over time. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 67287 (1999); Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 61, 71 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
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Though these homes may be less valuable than those in segregated
neighborhoods, becoming an "Integrationist" parent (i.e., one who
prefers integrated neighborhoods or schools) and remaining in (or
moving to) minority neighborhoods would help them reduce their
housing costs. 66 The best way, however, to keep middle-class parents
out of the bidding wars but also give their children a good education is
to align the interests of the middle class with those of low-income
minority public school children.
B.

Converging the Interests of Middle Class Parents and Minority
Public School Children

The data in The Two-Income Trap clearly show the flaws of zip
code school assignments. Middle-class parents who join the bidding
wars are, to a great extent, acting consistent with popular beliefs about
housing markets. Most nonpoor homeowners believe that they have
the right to live in a neighborhood that excludes the "wrong" type of
resident and to have their children attend a "good" school that
excludes certain children, especially now that Supreme Court rulings
permit school districts to end desegregation plans and return to
(segregated) neighborhood schools. 67 The fact that the resident who is
excluded (often illegally) is poor or a minority, and the schools in
poor, minority neighborhoods are often inadequately funded, appears
to be accepted as part of that property right. 68 Though it may be
difficult to convince middle-class parents to relinquish this "right" to
exclude, it may be possible to do so if their interests and those of
minority public school children converge. 69 Stated differently, zip code
school assignments both fail to eliminate the problems associated with
urban schools, and exacerbate the financial woes of suburban middleincome families. Any solution that makes urban schools better should
also make suburban parents better off.
66. Armstrong, supra note 30, at 1064. Parents who remain in integrated neighborhoods
may save enough to send their children to (segregated) private schools. Indeed, data suggest
that the percentage of whites in urban cities is significantly higher than the white student
enrollment in public schools. While some of this discrepancy may be caused by minorities'
relatively lower ages but higher birth rates, it appears that many white urban parents send
their children to private schools. See NOGUERA, supra note 12, at 27-28, 39; ORFIELD &
LEE, supra note 20, at 12.
67. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992);
Bd. of Educ. of Okla. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); see also ORFIELD & LEE, supra note
20, at 17-18 (discussing the resegregation of neighborhood schools).
68. See Orfield, supra note 13, at 853.
69. See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS 69 (2004) (suggesting that blacks' interest
in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only if it converges with white
policymakers' interests).
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Increasing the Desirability of Public Schools

a. District Public School Choice. To help decrease middle-class
parents' housing costs, the Two-Income Trap proposes a voucher
program that would be restricted to public schools. Such a program
should help eliminate the controversies typically associated with
private or parochial school voucher programs. Even using the term
voucher, however, is likely to cause opponents of private school
voucher programs (including most civil rights organizations70) to
oppose a public school voucher program. Also, middle-class parents
will likely oppose radical changes to the public school system unless
they can be assured that the program will maintain a stable middleclass majority. Moreover, because voucher programs typically are
designed to let only a few students transfer from "bad" to "good"
schools, a voucher program will not raise the overall quality and safety
of public schools or convince middle-class families to avoid the
bidding wars. 71
To convince middle-class families to avoid the bidding wars,
localities should let parents apply to have their children attend the
public school of their choice - regardless of its geographical location.
Housing patterns suggest that some white households will remain in
an integrated urban neighborhood - even if they are in the minority
- if they have no school-age children. 72 Given this, and assuming
opinion polls correctly reflect homeowners' preferences to live in
integrated neighborhoods, then middle-class parents should support a
carefully crafted, fully funded public school choice program. This
"choice" program would need to have certain basic features. First, to
allay middle and upper-class parents' apprehensions and also to
ensure that all parents understand how the program works, the
program must be widely publicized in a medium (and language) that is
likely to reach most parents. 73 Second, to make the program attractive
70. See Letter from the National Coalition for Public Education, to Omnibus Conferees
Opposing
D.C.
Vouchers
(Nov.
18,
2003),
at
http://www .aclu.org/ReligiousLiberty/ReligiousLiberty.cfm ?ID= 14429&c= 140
(opposing
vouchers in Washington, D.C. school system).
71. Stephen L. Gessner, The Dangers of Fashionable Education Reform, 11 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REv. 235, 238 (2000); Jennifer A. Henrikson, Comment, Jackson v. Benson: School
Vouchers- Offering an Apple to Private Schools; Creating a Serpent for Public Schools, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 259, 276 (1999).
72. Richard A. Smith, Discovering Stable Racial Integration, 20 J. URB. AFF. 1 (1998);
Steven Pearlstein, Moving Closer to a 'Living Downtown', WASH. POST, May 23, 2003, at E1;
United Press International, U.S. Cities Have Fewer Kids, More Singles (June 13, 2001), at
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/6/13/52513.shtml; Mark Sauer, Downtown's
Upturn; It's a Vibrant Place to Live, Even if Some Urban Ills Remain, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., Sept. 21, 2003, at El. See Orfield, supra note 13, at 850, 859.
73. In general, when school systems experiment with different choice options (magnet
schools, charter schools, etc.) lower income families tend to get less access to the most highly
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and feasible for all parents, it must include free transportation. 74
The program should force parents to rank their school preferences
when their children enter primary/elementary, middle/junior high, and
senior high schooP5 Schools that receive more applications than the
available slots would conduct a lottery. Parents who do not get their
first-choice school through the lottery would then be assigned to their
next-ranked school. A properly administered choice program should
eliminate the gross disparities between the best schools and those
viewed as the "rock-bottom" schools by assigning children with
lower test scores and higher delinquency and absentee rates
throughout the district.
The program must be designed to prevent parents from moving to
another neighborhood to circumvent the program's results. That is, if
parents can reapply by moving to another part of the school district,
they will have an incentive to move (or claim they moved) to get
another chance to apply for their first-choice school. To prevent this, if
the family moves before their child is scheduled to attend the next
level of education (i.e. middle/junior high or senior high), the child's
school placement would not change, thus eliminating the incentive to
join the bidding wars. Of course, a choice program will only succeed if
middle-class parents' housing decisions truly are motivated by the
quality of the public schools - not by a preference to avoid integrated
neighborhoods and schools. If parents' primary preference is to avoid
living near minorities, then even a program that ensured that their
children would attend safe, quality public schools will not prevent
them from fleeing a racially transitioning neighborhood.
b. Metropolitan Public School Choice. In urban school districts
with a declining white population and an increasing percentage of lowincome minority students, a district-only choice program will not
prevent middle-class flight, because it could not keep a middle-class
white majority in each school. Even Integrationist parents in these
districts might resist having their children attend schools that are
overwhelming minority. Indeed, if most schools in a district are viewed
as bad, even Integrationist parents would likely join the bidding wars.
Because a district program would have a limited geographical scope,
middle-income parents could move to another district and, thus, avoid
having to place their children in minority schools. To prevent this,
regarded schools. See FRANKENBERG & LEE, supra note 22, at 13.
74. See, e.g., Charles Mas, Navigating the School Choice Maze, SEATTLE PRESS, Dec. 30,
1998 (discussing transportation logistics in school choice program).
75. To decrease the disruption to children who are already attending schools, their
parents should be allowed to opt out of the choice system and keep their children in their
existing buildings. Once a child reaches the next school level (i.e., junior high/middle school
or senior high), s/he would be assigned to a school based on the choice program.
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school districts and localities (or states) should enact a metropolitanwide school choice program. 76 Data suggest that metropolitan or
countywide desegregation efforts have helped stem white flight, and
that the school districts that have had the most stable white
enrollments are in areas with metropolitan desegregation plans that
help ensure that the majority of students in each school will be middle
class. 77 While courts generally cannot order a county- or metropolitanwide mandatory busing program, nothing prevents localities from
voluntarily creating one. 78

C.

Choice + Private Auction

For some areas, a school choice program alone would not give
middle-class parents adequate incentives to avoid participating in the
housing bidding wars. A choice program alone is especially unlikely to
attract middle-class parents in districts whose schools have significant
resource and personnel disparities. 79 For example, even Integrationist
parents likely would refuse to let their children attend school in an
aging facility that lacks modern technology or other desirable
amenities that newer schools, or schools located in nonminority
neighborhoods, tend to have. 80 Moreover, as some research suggests
that teachers in lower socioeconomic schools are less qualified and
have less experience than those in richer suburban schools, even
parents who are committed to the principles of racial integration
would resist having their children taught by teachers they feel
are unqualified. 81

76. Because whites may soon be the minority in a number of states, not even a
metropolitan-wide plan could ensure that they will be in the majority. Implementing a
metropolitan wide choice program will, however, at least decrease the likelihood that whites
will always be in the overwhelming minority in the schools in any given school district. See
Orfield, supra note 13, at 831.
77. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 20, at 30-31; Orfield, supra note 13, at 831, 841-44. In
fact, one of the most successful integration plans was that of Charlotte, North Carolina,
where there had been a countywide desegregation plan until the school district was forced to
end the plan after being sued by a white parent. See ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 20, at 36-37.
78. Expanding the choice program beyond district boundaries would need to be
voluntary because of the United States Supreme Court's edict in Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717, 745 (1974), that school desegregation orders must be limited to single districts
unless there is proof that the districts engaged in racially discriminatory acts to cause the
interdistrict segregation.
79. These disparities generally are caused by low parental involvement in the public
schools or decreased participation in efforts to lobby school boards to increase resources to
individual schools. See NOGUERA, supra note 12, at 84-86. Race and economics are, again,
factors, as low-income parents tend to be less involved with their children's schools. /d.
80. See JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS 98 (1991).
81. FRANKENBERG & LEE, supra note 22, at 14; NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS,

May2005]

Caught in the Trap

1291

Until school districts can equalize personnel, resources, and facility
disparities, 82 the choice program should include an auction option
available only for parents who live in racially integrated
neighborhoods. 83 The auction would be restricted to Integrationist
parents to penalize non-Integrationist parents for their racially biased
(or hostile) views, and to compensate parents who are willing to
further the societal interest in having integrated neighborhoods and
schools. Ultimately, this will help prevent the resegregation of
neighborhoods, and may induce some middle-class parents to live in
urban metropolitan areas. 84 Moreover, being able to increase the odds
that your children can attend the "best" school may give nonIntegrationist parents an incentive to live in an integrated
neighborhood. Under a choice + auction program, Integrationists
parents whose children are not assigned to their first-choice school
(School A) should have the option of buying a slot at that school from
the parent of a child assigned to School A. The parent of a School A
child might be willing to sell the slot even if School A is perceived as
being the "good" school if the parent prefers the geographical location
SCHOOL AND STAFFING SURVEY (2003), at http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass; RESOURCES FOR
INDISPENSABLE SCHOOLS AND EDUCATORS (RISE), Program Seeks to Close the Gap,
Quality Counts 2003 (Jan. 7, 2003), at http://www.risenetwork.org/news_rel_close_gap.html
(interpreting the Schools and Staffing Survey).
82. To eliminate existing disparities, school systems should make sure "good" teachers
are in all schools by paying bonuses to "good" teachers who are willing to teach in schools
viewed as "bad." Only teachers whose students have performed well on the state's
standardized tests, those who are viewed as "master" teachers by their principals, or are
curriculum leaders should be offered this bonus incentive. School disparities also could be
eliminated by increasing the attractiveness of "bad" schools (for example, by giving the
school a disproportionate share of new technology, equipment or supplies, addressing its
facility maintenance needs before the needs of other schools, allowing smaller classes and
student/teacher ratios, by giving the teachers in the school greater flexibility in the
classroom, etc.), or by randomly assigning teachers to schools. While random assignments
may initially cause some teachers to quit, if teachers receive more money to teach in "bad"
schools and the school system gives those schools proportionately more resources than
"good" schools, over time teachers will stop resisting assignments to "bad" schools.
83. Because available data suggest that neighborhoods resegregate when more than
twenty percent of minorities moved into the neighborhood, an integrated neighborhood
should be defined as one that has at least twenty-five percent of minorities. This percentage
may not be the "ideal" for either whites or blacks. See Sander, supra note 29, at 896
(suggesting that optimal white/black ratio for whites is 80/20 while the range for blacks is
70/30 to 40/60).
84. This solution is similar to a federal initiative that assists school systems that operate
desegregated schools by providing housing counseling programs or housing down payment
and credit assistance programs. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HOUSING AND CIVIL
ENFORCEMENT SECTION, SCHOOLS AND HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES INITIATIVE, at
http://www.usdoj.
gov/crt/housing/housing_init.htm (last updated Mar. 1, 2000). Some individual cities also
provide incentives to residents who move into an area where they are in the overwhelming
minority. See Wiggins, supra note 31, at 765-66; Orfield, supra note 13, at 868.
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of a school perceived as being of lesser quality (School B) or if the
parent simply needs the money a seller parent is offering.85
The school district should participate in the auction by, at a
minimum, matching potential buyer and seller parents, and buyer
parents should be required to pay a fee to cover the system's costs of
administering the auction. A potential consequence of the choice +
auction program is that it might increase the educational costs for
Integrationist middle-class parents who do not get their first-choice
school. 86 While they will be required to pay both the school system's
broker fee and the market price for the slot at School A, the choice +
auction program would help middle-class parents overall avoid the
high, fixed mortgage costs associated with suburban homes in certain
districts, and will let them separate their educational and housing
decisions. Since purchasing a slot is a one-time expenditure, unlike a
fifteen- to thirty-year mortgage obligation, parents could more easily
decrease their monthly expenses if they face a financial crisis since the
purchase will not be an ongoing expense. 87 While the market
ultimately would determine the cost of school slots, rational-buyer
parents would not offer more than private tuition costs. In addition,
given the price differential between housing in markets viewed as

85. In addition, if School B has a higher minority enrollment or has more minority
teachers and the parent of a School A child is a minority, that parent might prefer School B's
racial composition and be willing to sell her slot at the "better" School A. Maureen Downey,
Black Schools White Schools; With Court-Ordered Busing Fading and Races Choosing to
Live Separately, Classrooms are Heading Back to Where They Started - Segregated,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 22, 2003, at lE (discussing reluctance of some minority parents
to send their children to overwhelmingly white schools); see also Mark S. Lewis, Am. Ass'n
of Colleges for Teacher Educ., Supply and Demand of Teachers of Color, EDUCATIONAL
RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER DIGEST 94-8 (1994), at http://www.ericdigests.org/19963/supply.htm (discussing view held by some middle class black parents that segregated
schools benefit their children because they provide minority teacher role models).
86. For example, assume a white parent lived in an integrated neighborhood whose
school had been forty percent white, and the parent's child is assigned to a school which had
a ninety-five percent minority population and was widely viewed as bad or unsafe before the
auction. Despite their preferences for integrated schools, these parents likely would enter
the auction, and potentially attempt to buy a slot in their neighborhood school, to avoid
having their child attend what they perceive as a rock-bottom integrated school. The choice
+auction program would, thus, force these parents to pay to attend an integrated school that
would have been free but for the program.
87. Of course, lenders may attempt to convince families to borrow against their home
equity to finance the slot purchase, thus converting a one-time expenditure into an ongoing
monthly expense. Though some middle-class families may find themselves back in a high,
fixed mortgage trap, there would be a net decrease in the number of middle-class families in
the trap, since, over time, the gross inequalities in schools will disappear, some parents
would be assigned to School A and would not need to finance the purchase of the slot, and
parents would need to borrow only the amount needed to finance the purchase of a School
A slot at their child's existing school level (i.e., elementary, middle, high school) since they
would re-enter the lottery system (and have the opportunity to apply for a new School A)
once their child reached the next level.
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having "good" schools and markets viewed as having poor schools, the
price of a slot would need to be quite high before the choice + auction
program would be more expensive than the suburban bidding wars. 88
Potential homeowners and parents who prefer both integrated
neighborhoods and good, safe schools would have an incentive to
aggressively advocate for the choice + auction program. NonIntegrationists parents who expected a dramatic increase in the value
of their suburban homes may resist any program that stems the rapid
appreciation. The choice + auction system should not be rejected for
this reason, though, since it will not eliminate all of their expected
profits (since people will always move to affluent neighborhoods for
reasons other than the neighborhood schools). Moreover, rejecting the
choice + auction system merely to protect the property interests of
homeowners who made racially-biased housing purchases is morally
repugnant and, essentially, would force Integrationist parents to
subsidize the race-based preferences of people who prefer segregated
schools and neighborhoods. 89 Indeed, if the homeowners' property
fails to appreciate as rapidly as they had anticipated, then this "loss"
should be viewed as an additional segregation penalty and as a way to
force them to internalize the costs of their race-based preferences.
Anything other than a purely random assignment may, over time,
lead to dynamic resegregation since some parents may live in an
integrated neighborhood simply to have the right to participate in the
auction. Once they get their child into their school of choice, some
may move to a segregated neighborhood (especially if this was their
primary preference all along). Moreover, the auction may, over time,

88. There is often a threefold difference between the housing stock in cities perceived to
have "good" schools and those with "bad" schools. See Melissa Data, Home Sales by Zip
Code, at http://www.melissadata.comflookups/homesales.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2004).
According to the website, average home sale prices in February 2004 for several
Massachusetts towns were as follows: Newton ($829,000); Wellesley ($975,000); Dorchester
($356,000); Roxbury ($319,000). Average prices in several Washington, D.C. metro areas
were as follows: Bethesda ($648,000); Chevy Chase ($750,000); Anacostia ($196,000).
Average prices in Bay Area in California were as follows: Palo Alto ($960,000); San
Francisco ($934,000); East Palo Alto ($563,000); Emeryville ($351,000). Because, however,
those neighborhoods will no longer be able to capitalize the value of the zoned "good"
school in the housing prices, demand for suburban housing should decrease and housing
prices ultimately should stabilize.
89. For example, zip code school assignments help to keep concentrated levels of
poverty in certain, typically urban, schools. Integrationist parents who do not want their
children to attend schools that have high poverty concentrations may feel compelled to
participate in the bidding wars. These parents would benefit from the choice + auction
program since they could remain in an integrated neighborhood but avoid having their
children attend schools with high concentrations of poverty. Rejecting the choice + auction
program because of the racial views of non-Integrationist parents would increase the housing
costs of Integrationist parents in order to protect the racial preferences of non-Integrationist
parents.
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cause a bidding war for School As and may cause those schools to
resegregate if they are perceived as being better than others based on
the income level or racial composition of the student population. Even
if these unintended consequences occur, the benefits of the choice +
auction program still outweigh the risks. First, once parents realize
that they cannot move to a neighborhood to ensure that their children
will attend nonminority schools, then at least some neighborhoods
that might have resegregated may instead remain stably integrated,
and those parents can avoid the housing trap. While some parents may
choose to move to a segregated neighborhood after they participate in
the choice + auction system, others may choose to remain in the
integrated neighborhood both because they no longer need to move to
get a "good" school and also because their preference for segregated
neighborhoods may change once they actually live near minorities. 90
Thus, even if some neighborhoods and schools do resegregate, the
auction system should at least retard the process.
CONCLUSION

Policymakers often resist enacting policies that benefit minorities if
they perceive that those policies will harm nonminorities or
suburbanites. 91 If public schools are more attractive to all parents,
however, fewer middle-class parents will be caught in the two-income
trap, neighborhood resegregation should decrease, and urban public
schools will stop being viewed as dumping grounds for those who lack
better options. To a great extent, black and brown children in urban
schools are the miner's canaries for all families: society's failure to
heed the warnings raised by their inadequate schools ultimately will
cause harm to the children of suburban middle-income parents.92
Improving the lives of poor urban children will help them and middleclass families. While a school choice program would not have
neighborhood integration as its primary goal, converging the interests
of middle-class parents and minority school children ultimately will
help parents avoid the two-income trap, tackle the longstanding
problems associated with urban public schools, and prevent the
seemingly intractable problem of neighborhood resegregation.

90. See ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 20, at 24-25 (suggesting that whites' proximity to
blacks in schools and neighborhoods increases the likelihood that they will have cross-racial
friendships and will have a higher comfort level with members of other races and that
children who attend integrated schools express a greater desire to live in a multiracial
setting).

91. See BELL, supra note 69, at 69.
92. LAN! GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 11 (2002).

